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ARTICLES 
 
 
Limits and Limitations of Power: The Continued Rele-
vance of Occupation Law 
 
By Ebrahim Afsah* 
 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
Lawyers are trained to apply rules to certain situations, and thus determining 
whether a particular behaviour is norm-conformant or not. It is generally assumed 
that rules as such exist and are applicable in a given situation. While there might be 
a debate about identifying the appropriate normative set among competing legal 
frameworks, it is generally taken as a given that binding rules exist and that they 
are habitually complied with. With regard to international relations, this basic 
ontological outlook contrast somewhat with the analytical conceptions taken by 
other disciplines which rely on other explanatory variables – notably power and 
interest – to account for the behavioural patterns of states. 
 
In an influential review article the international lawyer Koh took up this extra-
disciplinary challenge, trying to answer the question as to why nations chose to 
fulfil international legal obligations.1 Those defending the notion that a body of 
fixed rules exists and that it is habitually complied with had to content with two 
main challenges:2 the ‘realist’ claim that whatever exists at the international level is 
not really law because it lacks the defining characteristic of enforceability,3 and the 
‘rationalistic’ position that states only follow international rules as long as it serves 
their interests. Realists largely dismiss international law as secondary phenomena 
that are incapable of substantially affecting the calculations of power and interest 
                                                 
* Heidelberg/Amman. Email: eafsah@gmail.com. 
1 Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE LAW JOURNAL 2599-659 
(1997). 
2 Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE LAW JOURNAL (1997), 2602. 
3 For a general discussion see MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003), chapter 1; Koh, 
Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE LAW JOURNAL (1997), 2602, fn. 9; JOST DELBRÜCK 
(ED.), THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT (1993); Josef L. Kunz, Sanctions in 
International Law, 54 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 324-47  (1960); Peter J. Spiro, 
The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and Its False Prophets, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, no pagination 
(2000). 
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that ultimately determine state behaviour. Rationalists are somewhat more 
accommodating towards empirical record of widespread rule adherence,4 but are in 
essential agreement that in the absence of a central enforcement mechanism 
considerations of power and interest will ultimately prevail: “since there is nobody 
to enforce the law, nations will comply with international law only if it is in their 
interest to do so; they will disregard law or obligation if the advantages of violation 
outweigh the advantages of observance.”5 
 
Such scepticism concerning the binding nature of law is even more pronounced 
with regard to the laws of war.6 Given the high stakes and the existential nature of 
the violence, it has been argued that the idea of imposing legal limits on the 
exercise of state violence is futile because since “[w]ar is an act of force, there is no 
logical limitation to the application of force.”7 This argument against idealistic 
legalism is firmly based on reason of state not a militaristic defence of untram-
melled violence. Clausewitz’ famous dictum about war as the continuation of 
politics by other means holds that “war is only a branch of political activity” and 
thus must not become an end in itself but has to serve political ends.8 The aim is 
thus not the destruction of the enemy but the inducement of a certain type of 
political behaviour to which end military violence is used. It is in this context that 
Clausewitz maintains that whatever limitation a war-fighting power submits to is 
not due to an altruistic normative commitment but the availability of more effective 
strategic or tactical means: 
 
if civilised nations do not put their prisoners to death or devastate 
cities and countries, it is because intelligence plays a larger part in 
their methods [than was the case among savages] and has taught 
                                                 
4 Reflected in the often-quoted statement by Henkin that “almost all nations observe almost all principles 
of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.” LOUIS HENKIN, HOW 
NATIONS BEHAVE (1979), 47. 
5 Discussed in HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE (1979), 49. 
6 Leslie C. Green, What Is - Why Is There - The Law of War?, ESSAYS ON THE MODERN LAW OF WAR 
(Leslie C. Green ed., 1999); Leslie C. Green, Cicero and Clausewitz or Quincy Wright? The Interplay of Law 
and War, ESSAYS ON THE MODERN LAW OF WAR (Leslie C. Green ed., 1999); LESLIE C. GREEN, 
THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (2000), chapter 1 and 2. 
7 CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR (1976), ch. 2, para. 90, ch. 1, para. 76. quoted in Leslie C. Green, 
What Is - Why Is There - The Law of War?, ESSAYS ON THE MODERN LAW OF WAR (Leslie C. Green 
ed., 1999), 1. 
8 Carl von Clausewitz, The Political Purposes of War, BASIC TEXTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
(Evan Luard ed., 1992), 244. 
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them more effective ways of using force than the crude expression of 
instinct.9 
 
Looking at the Iraq war from this angle, it is hard to argue that it has served either 
the professed or implied interests of the main belligerent powers particularly well.10 
The issues concerning the decision to go to war have been exhaustively debated in 
the literature.11 The applicable ius in bello can usefully be divided into two periods: 
that of actual combat operations ending on 1 May 2003,12 and the subsequent 
period of occupation. The following observations are less concerned with specific 
legal questions relating to the proportionality and type of violence that arose in the 
context of actual combat operations,13 but focus on the occupation period, and in 
particular the legality of the political changes introduced by the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA).  
                                                 
9 VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR (1976), ch. 2, para. 90, ch. 1, para. 76, emphasis added. 
10 Sir Michael Rose, Invasion a 'Blunder of Enormous Significance', THE GUARDIAN; LARRY DIAMOND, 
SQUANDERED VICTORY: THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION AND THE BUNGLED EFFORT TO 
BRING DEMOCRACY TO IRAQ (2005); DAVID PHILLIPS, LOOSING IRAQ (2005); Kenneth M. Pollock 
/ Iraq Policy Working Group, A Switch in Time - a New Strategy for America in Iraq, (2006). Pollock is the 
most optimistic of the group, despite the devastating record he attests the policy so far. The policy 
prescriptions he advocates, however, remain less than convincing, ranging from the introduction of food 
stamps (p. xvi) to raising overall troop numbers to 450,000 (p. x). 
11 See inter alia Erika de Wet, The Illegality of the Use of Force Against Iraq Subsequent to the Adoption of 
Resolution 687 (1991), 3 HUMANITÄRES VÖLKERRECHT 125-32 (2003); Lori Fisler Damrosch / Bernard 
H. Oxman, Editor's Introduction, 97 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 556 (2003); Lori 
Fisler Damrosch / Bernard H. Oxman / et al., Agora: Future Implications of the Iraq Conflict, 97 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 553-656 (2003); Carsten Stahn, Enforcement of the 
Collective Will After Iraq, 97 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 804-23 (2003); John C. 
Yoo, International Law and the War in Iraq, 97 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 563 
(2003); Alex J. Bellamy, International Law and the War With Iraq, 4 MELBOURNE JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 497-520 (2003). 
12 Declared by President Bush in a speech aboard the warship USS Abraham Lincoln. The speech has 
since proved a source of considerable embarrassment to the president, due to its staged nature and the 
realisation that given the violence in Iraq its major claims were premature. See inter alia Michael Elliott, 
So What Went Wrong?, TIME 2003, at 14. 
The president deliberately did not declare the end of the war, arguably to avoid legal responsibilities 
related to prisoners of war and war criminals, see M. Hmond, The Use of Force Against Iraq: Occupation 
and Security Council Resolution 1483, 36 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 443 (2004). This 
line of argument has been criticised by Rüdiger Wolfrum, Iraq: From Belligerent Occupation to Iraqi 
Exercise of Sovereignty: Foreign Power Versus International Community Interference, 9 MAX PLANCK 
YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW (2005), 2. 
13 Gary D. Brown, Proportionality and Just War, 2 JOURNAL OF MILITARY ETHICS 171 - 185 (2003); 
CHRISTOPHER ANGLIM, THE IRAQ WAR (2003) - A DOCUMENTARY LEGAL HISTORY (2004); 
Ronli Sifris, Operation Iraqi Freedom - United States v Iraq - the Legality of the War, 4 MELBOURNE 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 521-60 (2003). 
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It has been argued that the static nature of occupation law places an undue 
emphasis on preserving the socio-political status quo of an occupied territory. 
Given the increasing acceptance within the international community of the 
applicability of certain universal standards of human rights and good governance,14 
and given further the belief in a causal link between internal repressiveness and 
external aggression it has been held that the traditional concept of state sovereignty 
needs to be modified to account for these universal values.15 
 
The traditional notion of state sovereignty is reflected in what appears to be a fairly 
straight-forward legal rule of occupation law protecting the institutions, legal and 
social system of the occupied territory from alterations by the occupant. Article 43 
of the Hague Regulations states: 
 
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed to the 
hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all measures in his 
power to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and 
safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in 
force in the country.16 
 
The provision contains three substantive elements: the occupation regime is based 
on factual control, it establishes the right as well as the duty of the occupier to 
provide security, and, importantly, stresses the temporary nature of the occupation 
regime by protecting the continued existence of the occupied state. Pictet is quite 
categorical in this respect: 
 
the occupying power [is] to be considered as merely being a de 
facto administrator. This provision of the Hague Regulations (Art. 
43) is not only applicable to the inhabitants of the occupied terri-
tory; it also protects the separate existence of the state, its institu-
tions and its laws.17 
                                                 
14 Michael W. Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AMERICAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 866 et seq. (1990); GREGORY H. FOX / BRAD R. ROTH (EDS.), 
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2000); Rudolf Dolzer, Good Governance: 
Neues Transnationales Leitbild der Staatlichkeit?, 64 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES 
ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 535-46 (2004). 
15 Juliane Kokott, Souveräne Gleichheit und Demokratie im Völkerrecht, 64 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 517-33 (2004). 
16 Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 2 AJIL Supp. 90 (1908). 
17 JEAN PICTET (ED.), COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION IV OF 1949 (1958), 273. 
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It has now been argued that irrespective of the legality or legitimacy of the armed 
conflict that gives rise to the occupation regime, the transformation of an 
oppressive and aggressive governmental system is in the interest of the 
international community and possibly necessary for the maintenance or restoration 
of international peace. To demand therefore that an occupier should respect the 
legal and socio-political system put in place by a tyrannical regime seems counter-
intuitive. Thus even writers who have questioned the ius ad bellum have maintained 
that “[g]iven the technical and, in particular, political changes that have occurred in 
modern warfare, international humanitiarian law can no longer be considered 
comprehensive.”18 
 
The requirement by the international community that international humanitarian 
law, including the law of occupation will be strictly respected19 has in principle 
been recognised by the United States and the United Kingdom as the main coalition 
powers.20 Regarding the introduction of far-reaching political changes in Iraq, 
however, there has been an element of tension between the above stated 
requirement to respect the laws and institutions in place, and the perceived 
necessity to fundamentally transform Iraqi society. To defuse this tension it has 
been argued that international humanitarian law needs to be developed to permit 
such necessary transformative processes by the occupier. 
 
This paper argues that irrespective of the unquestionable desirability, even 
necessity to introduce democratic and liberal reforms into a society such as the Iraqi 
one, an occupation regime cannot be considered the adequate tool. The law of 
occupation is primarily a negative boundary marker to protect the occupied 
population from abuse. Calls for a revision of the law of occupation assume a 
commonality of interest between occupier and the occupied population that is 
unlikely to find widespread acceptance in the target population. Whatever the 
shortcomings of the current law of occupation, claiming its obsolescence 
conveniently disregards the fact that a clear and evidently usable mechanism exists 
in the instrument of a robust Security Council mandate which could easily provide 
the legal basis for the kind of societal and state transformation deemed necessary. 
 
                                                 
18 Wolfrum, Iraq: From Belligerent Occupation to Iraqi Exercise of Sovereignty, 9 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK 
OF UNITED NATIONS LAW (2005), 5. 
19 Recognised primarily in S/RES/1483 (2003) of 22 May 2003, preamb. para. 13, op. para. 5. 
20 Using somewhat guarded language in the Letters Dated 8 May 2003 from the Permanent 
Representatives of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of 
America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2003/538. 
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Scheffer for instance agrees that current humanitarian law is inadequate to address 
the needs of a society in political, judicial, and economic collapse which “requires 
far more latitude for transformational development than would be anticipated 
under these instruments [the Hague Regulations and Geneva Conventions].”21 But 
he is quick to point out that an evidently usable alternative mechanism already 
exists in the form of Security Council authorisation: “the intended political 
transformational process in Iraq “requires strained interpretations of occupation 
law to suit modern requirements. Such unique circumstances are far better 
addressed by a tailored nation-building mandate of the Security Council.”22 
 
That such a mandate could not be obtained reflects the lack of consensus about how 
such a transformation could or should have been achieved. The subsequent failure 
of the process put in motion by the occupation23 forces attests to the importance of 
legitimacy and multilateral involvement, something that can only be sustained 
through a clear multilateral mandate. More importantly, a successful socio-political 
transformation rests on the acceptance by the target population of its means and 
direction. The status quo limitations imposed by the law of occupation should thus 
not be interpreted as safeguarding anachronistic institutions but as protecting the 
right of the population to determine its own socio-political structure. The failure of 
the US-led political process also hints at the inherent limits of effecting such far-
reaching transformative processes by occupational fiat. These inherent limits are 
mirrored in the limitations imposed by humanitarian law, pointing to a certain 
humility about the possibilities of military power. It is this respect that we argue 
that despite its evident shortcomings international humanitarian law might actually 
be far more pertinent than the repeated calls for its development suggest. 
 
 
B. Reasons for Failure 
 
Three interrelated aspects have severely hamstrung the reconstruction efforts in 
Iraq from the beginning: the failure to provide security in the aftermath of the 
conflict, the absence of a clear political strategy, and the lack of legitimacy of the 
occupation. Overall, the situation provides, in the words of former National 
Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, a “striking contrast” between the situation 
                                                 
21 David J. Scheffer, Beyond Occupation Law, 97 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2003), 849. 
22 Scheffer, Beyond Occupation Law, 97 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003), 843. 
23 Charles  Tripp, The United States and State-Building in Iraq, 30 REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL 
STUDIES 545-58 (2004). 
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in Afghanistan as compared to Iraq.24 It provides in many respects a cautionary tale 
about the inherent limits of military power: “President Bush's characterization of 
the invasion of Iraq as a “catastrophic success” depicts a unique reality: a relative 
ease in invading a country but difficulty in governing it.”25 
 
With few dissenting voices,26 most analyses stress the glaring lack of preparation 
and advance planning, coupled with a steadfast refusal to accept realities on the 
ground to explain the failure of such well-intentioned policy.27 A very large number 
of competent examinations of the strategic and tactical mistakes have been 
undertaken, coming to quite different conclusions about the proper course of action 
to be followed now.28 Most, however, seem to agree about the “paucity of good 
options now before the United States.”29  
                                                 
24 Quoted by Karl Inderfurth in Thomas P. Lauth et al., Building the Institutions of the Nation, 33 GEORGIA 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (2004), 186; Daniel Byman et al., Iraq, 
Afghanistan and the War on "Terror", 12 MIDDLE EAST POLICY 1-24 (2005); ANTHONY H. 
CORDESMAN, THE WAR AFTER THE WAR: STRATEGIC LESSONS OF IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN 
(2004); Anthony H. Cordesman, American Strategic, Tactical, and Other Mistakes in Iraq: A Litany of Errors, 
2006. 
25 Abbas J. Ali / Philip M. Nufrio, Post War Iraq: Understanding and Shaping the Forces of Positive Changes, 
10 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT (2005), 31. Ali and Nufrio continue with a stark 
comparison: “Indeed, the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 is similar in many aspects to the Mongol invasion 
of Iraq in 1258. While the Mongols were effective in ending the Abbasids regime, they had to forcefully 
suppress the Iraqis into submission. Years later, the Mongols exited Iraq but left it in ruins.” 
26 Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute denounces most critics of having no first-hand experience 
of Iraq and concludes: “The future of Iraq is anything but bleak.” Michael Rubin, The Future of Iraq: 
Democracy, Civil War, Or Chaos?, 9 MIDDLE EAST REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, no 
pagination (2005); Charles Krauthammer, A Sensible Iraqi Constitution, WASHINGTON POST, at A29. 
27 Gerard Toal, A Conversation With Peter Galbraith About Iraq and State Building, GEOPOLITICS (2005), 
171; Louis J. Cantori et al., Evaluating the Bush Menu for Change in the Middle East, Roundtable of the 
Conference Group on the Middle East At the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, 
September 5, 2004, 12 MIDDLE EAST POLICY 97-121 (2005). 
28 Former ambassador Galbraith and the head of the Council of Foreign Relations Gelb argue for a 
partition of the country into sustainable entities along ethnic lines; former Secretary of Defence Laird 
argues for an “Iraqisation” of security forces along the policy attempted in Vietnam allowing for a 
gradual withdrawal of US forces; RAND scholar Dobbins agrees with the need to place the main burden 
of security on moderate Iraqis, but believes that through its lack of legitimacy and credibility the US “has 
already lost the war” forcing Iraqis to look for support elsewhere. He thus argues for a regional initiative 
with strong Iranian involvement. Stanford political scientist Larry Diamond agrees that the growing 
legitimacy and credibility gap, resulting primarily from totally inadequate security provisions, i.e. troop 
numbers, severely hampered reconstruction efforts, stressing the need to build state and security 
structures because “a country must first have a state before it can become a democracy.” Military expert 
Krepinevich argues for staying the course but that a change in military tactics is required, based around 
the principles of counterinsurgency warfare. He argues that a so-called “oil-spot strategy” should focus 
on providing security in limited areas that would gradually spread rather than hunting down insurgent. 
His approach has since been adopted by the US Army. Pollock’s fairly positive (but by now somewhat 
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I. Lack of Security 
 
No one seriously doubted the outcome of the war, although there had been some 
surprise about the relative ease with which Coalition forces vanquished Iraqi 
formal units.30 The strategy seemed a resounding validation of the new military 
doctrine expounded by Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld against more cautious 
professional officers following the hitherto accepted military doctrine. 
 
This so-called Weinberger-Powell doctrine stipulated the application of 
overwhelming force as offering the greatest possibility of success while minimising 
casualties on both sides.31 Limited force, to be gradually enlarged as necessity 
grows, only invites the enemy to a test of wills that will draw out the conflict. This 
applies to both the period of actual combat as well as the post-conflict phase: 
“There appears to be an inverse correlation between the size of the stabilization 
force and the level of risk. The higher the proportion of stabilizing troops, the lower 
the number of casualties suffered and inflicted.”32 
 
To reduce the political and economic costs of such massive troop deployments the 
doctrine was subsequently modified to maximise the utility of unique American 
technical assets, especially its unassailable advantage in the so-called Revolution in 
                                                                                                                             
dated) assessment likewise questions whether “quick Iraqification” of security provision can be 
achieved. In a recent co-authored piece he makes a series of recommendations which remain 
unconvincing. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, the they fall far short of a convincing counter-strategy 
and one is left with the distinct realisation that the point of no return has basically been reached for US 
efforts and failure can no longer be avoided.  
James Dobbins, Iraq: Winning the Unwinnable War, FOREIGN AFFAIRS no pagination (2005); Peter 
Galbraith, How to Get Out of Iraq, 51 THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS no pagination (2004); Leslie 
H. Gelb, The Three State Solution, NEW YORK TIMES, at A27; Melvin R. Laird, Iraq: Learning the Lessons of 
Vietnam, FOREIGN AFFAIRS no pagination (2005); Larry Diamond, What Went Wrong in Iraq?, 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS no pagination (2004); Larry Jay Diamond, Lessons From Iraq, 16 JOURNAL OF 
DEMOCRACY 9-23 (2005); Rubin, The Future of Iraq: Democracy, Civil War, Or Chaos?, 9 MIDDLE EAST 
REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS no pagination (2005); Andrew F. Jr. Krepinevich, How to Win 
in Iraq, FOREIGN AFFAIRS no pagination (2005); Kenneth M. Pollock, After Saddam: Assessing the 
Reconstruction of Iraq, (2004); Pollock / Iraq Policy Working Group, A Switch in Time - a New Strategy for 
America in Iraq, (2006). 
29 Dobbins, Iraq: Winning the Unwinnable War, FOREIGN AFFAIRS no pagination (2005). 
30 For military details see ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, THE IRAQ WAR: STRATEGY, TACTICS AND 
MILITARY LESSONS (2003). 
31 John L. Hirsch / Robert B. Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, (1995), 77. 
32 JAMES DOBBINS et al., AMERICA’S ROLE IN NATION-BUILDING: FROM GERMANY TO IRAQ 
(2003), 198. 
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Military Affairs (RMA) to reduce manpower requirements.33 With reference to 
American pre-eminence in RMA, it was argued that victory could be achieved with 
far fewer troop numbers than hitherto assumed. Against the objections of the 
professional officer corps,34 the strategy used against Iraq was heavily based on 
mobility and firepower, but deploying substantially fewer soldiers than initially 
thought necessary.35 Battlefield developments seemed to solidly vindicate the new 
strategy. 
 
The occupation, however, exposed the shortcomings of this approach. Although the 
complete breakdown of social order was predictable36 and had in fact been 
predicted,37 no adequate mechanisms had been put in place. Commenting on the 
sacking of the national museum and other sites, Anne Joyce asks the prescient 
question: “Will the United States do a better job at nation building than at art-
historical preservation? The omens are not encouraging. President Bush has ended 
the war by declaring victory, but that is beyond his control. Wars only end when the 
defeated accept defeat.”38  
 
One lesson derived from the peacekeeping missions of the 1990s has been that 
insurgents, whether motivated for political or essentially criminal reasons, will test 
                                                 
33 RMA refers to the combined use and networked effect of high-altitude bombing with precision 
ammunition, wide-spread use of stealth technology, small, but highly mobile units drawn from different 
services but acting with very high degrees of coordination using real-time communication and 
positioning technology. See inter alia John J. Mearsheimer, Hans Morgenthau Und Der Irakkrieg, 59 
MERKUR (2005), 838; JOHN P. WHITE / ZALMAY KHALILZAD (EDS.), THE CHANGING ROLE OF 
INFORMATION IN WARFARE (1999). 
34 General Shinseki’s retirement was announced a year early, severely compromising his professional 
standing. Diamond, What Went Wrong in Iraq?, FOREIGN AFFAIRS no pagination (2004).  
35 During the 2003 campaign roughly 264,000 Coalition soldiers (214,000 Americans, 45,000 British, 2,000 
Australians and 2,400 Polish) participated, while in the 1991 campaign 660,000 Coalition troops were 
deployed, with no occupation duties envisaged. See Wikipedia, 2003 Invasion of Iraq, 2006, available at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003_Invasion_of_Iraq; Wikipedia, Gulf War, 2006, available at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Desert_Storm. For additional details see CORDESMAN, THE IRAQ 
WAR: STRATEGY, TACTICS AND MILITARY LESSONS (2003).  
The highly optimistic approach taken by the Pentagon is evidenced in the initial plan to draw troop 
numbers in Iraq until Summer 2003 down to 25,000 troops. See GEORGE PACKER, THE ASSASSINS' 
GATE: AMERICA IN IRAQ (2005). 
36 Massive looting had already occurred in the aftermath of the 1991 Iraq war. 
37 See inter alia Anthony H. Cordesman, Planning for a Self-Inflicted Wound: US Policy to Reshape a Post-
Saddam Iraq, 2002. See also the comment by the former British arts minister, Mark Fisher, Tomb Raiders, 
THE GUARDIAN, 21 January 2006. 
38 Anne Joyce, Editor's Note, 10 MIDDLE EAST POLICY (2003), iv, emphasis added. 
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the resolve of the outside force trying to maintain control. Academic and official 
consensus thus gradually shifted from consensual peacekeeping to muscular peace-
enforcing.39 Oakley and Hirsch examined the fiasco in Somalia and came to the 
conclusion that the basic tenets of normal US war-fighting doctrine also applied in 
post-conflict situations: convincing the (potential) opponent to accept defeat 
through the provision (though not necessary application) of overwhelming force.40  
 
That Iraq was an occupation and not a mandated peace-enforcing mission is not of 
much import in this respect. What matters is that the occupation force very quickly 
lost the initiative, credibility, and, ultimately, legitimacy by deploying too few and 
the wrong kind of troops to maintain the security which is a sine qua non of the 
subsequent political reconstruction process.41 Dobbins gave at the time some 
interesting statistical comparisons between the requisite numbers troop and civilian 
police numbers required for successful pacification.42 These numbers are now 
widely considered to have been accurate,43 but faced with the real prospect of civil 
war,44 the Coalition is actually drawing down its numbers in preparation for a full 
withdrawal.45 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 Rosalynne Higgins, The New United Nations and Former Yugoslavia,; Lakhdar Brahimi / et al., Report of 
the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations ("the Brahimi Report"), UN Doc a/55/305-S/2000/809, (2000). 
40 Hirsch / Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, (1995), 77; Adam Roberts, Humanitarian Action in 
War, Adelphi Paper 305, ADELPHI PAPERS (1996); Barry R. Posen, Military Responses to Refugee Disasters, 
21 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 72-111 (1996); CHARLES DOBBIE, A CONCEPT FOR POST-COLD 
WAR PEACEKEEPING (1994). 
41 Diamond, What Went Wrong in Iraq?, FOREIGN AFFAIRS no pagination (2004). 
42 Based on the levels deployed in Kosovo approximately 526,000 foreign troops and 53,000 international 
civilian police would have been required in Iraq. See James Dobbins, America’s Role in Nation-Building: 
From Germany to Iraq, 2003, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, available at:   
www.boell.de/downloads/demokratiefoerderung/dobbins_americas_role.pdf, 16-17. 
43 Pollock is quoting 440,000 as “the baseline figure for what will be required ultimately to stabilize Iraq.” 
Pollock / Iraq Policy Working Group, A Switch in Time - a New Strategy for America in Iraq, (2006), 25. 
44 International Crisis Group, The Next Iraqi War? Sectarianism and Civil Conflict, MIDDLE EAST 
BRIEFING NO. 52 (2006); Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iraqi Insurgency and the Risk of Civil War: Who Are 
the Players?, 2006; Anthony H. Cordesman / Eric M. Brewer / Sara Bjerg Moller, Iraq's Evolving 
Insurgency and the Risk of Civil War, 2006. 
45 From December 2005 until March 2006 US troop numbers had been reduced from 160,000 to 132,000., 
Rumsfeld Will US Soldaten Aus Bürgerkrieg Im Irak Heraushalten, DER SPIEGEL - ONLINE EDITION, 10 
March   2006. 
2006]                                                                                                                                   573 The Continued Relevance of Occupation Law
II. Lack of Political Strategy 
 
A related problem is the lack of a clear strategy for the socio-political reconstruction 
of the country. The situation again contrasts rather unfavourably with Afghanistan, 
where an ambitious but reasonable timetable was agreed in advance among all the 
major factions who were given sufficient stakes in the process to stay engaged and 
where spoilers were dealt with effectively through cooptation or intimidation. In 
Iraq, however, even the Economist, an early and consistent supporter of the war,46 
had to observe that: “Over the past year, Paul Bremer, Iraq’s American administra-
tor, has changed his plans so many times that Iraqis themselves, let alone spectators 
from afar, can be forgiven for being confused about what the Americans are 
currently proposing. This lack of clarity is one of the many failures of the 
occupation so far.”47 
 
The level of unpreparedness, particularly compared to earlier, successful nation-
building exercises48 is certainly surprising and has undoubtedly greatly put at risk 
the nation-building and democratisation efforts. But as Katz aptly points out, “our 
ineptness with regard to these practical, local and immediate issues is much less 
significant than our conceptual unpreparedness, a shortage of both analysis and 
imagination about the possibility of different, equally legitimate shapes democratic 
constitutionalism might take in these places.”49 This absence of comparative 
thinking, linked with the lack of knowledge about the country and its inhabitants 
                                                 
46 An interesting change of position in this regard is detectable in Pollock, who reversed his earlier 1999 
assessment that an invasion would be “a terrible mistake” based either on wishful thinking or cynical 
politics, by arguing the case of invasion in 2002. He has since regretted that latter stance, and come out 
strongly against the further use of violence to achieve political change in the region, with regard to Iraq 
he argues for staying the course against a premature withdrawal of troops. See Daniel Byman / Kenneth 
M. Pollock / Gideon Rose, The Rollback Fantasy, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1999); KENNETH M. POLLOCK, 
THREATENING STORM: THE CASE FOR INVADING IRAQ (2002); KENNETH M. POLLOCK, THE 
PERSIAN PUZZLE: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAN AND AMERICA (2004); Deborah Solomon, 
Questions for Kenneth Pollock, THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE; Pollock / Iraq Policy Working 
Group, A Switch in Time - a New Strategy for America in Iraq, (2006). 
47 Anonymous, The Challenge in Iraq, THE ECONOMIST 9 (2004). 
48 An element often under-emphasised in the once fashionable comparisons between Germany/Japan to 
Afghanistan/Iraq, see Stanley N. Katz, Gun Barrel Democracy? Democratic Constitutionalism Following 
Military Occupation: Reflections on the U.S. Experience in Japan, Germany, Afghanistan and Iraq, Princeton Law 
and Public Affairs Working Paper No. 04-010, PRINCETON LAW AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS WORKING 
PAPER SERIES SPRING SEMESTER (2004), 1; DOBBINS et al., AMERICA’S ROLE IN NATION-
BUILDING: FROM GERMANY TO IRAQ (2003). 
49 Katz, Gun Barrel Democracy? Democratic Constitutionalism Following Military Occupation, PRINCETON 
LAW AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS WORKING PAPER SERIES SPRING SEMESTER (2004), 1-2, emphasis in 
the original. 
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severely constrained the Coalition’s ability to put into motion a political process 
driven by and “bought into” by local actors. The almost complete lack of any 
international, i.e. non-American experts with relevant post-conflict experience, as 
well as the disproportionate reliance on Iraqi exiles of questionable reputation and 
with virtually no domestic following, further reduced the likelihood of finding 
suitable solutions acceptable to the population.  
 
 
III. Lack of Legitimacy 
 
The fact that by now “Iraq has gone from being a rogue state to being an ailing, if 
not failing one”50 poses important questions about the importance of legitimacy, 
institutional design, and popular participation. It also tells us much about the limits 
of external imposition.  
 
In 1949 Carl Schmitt ranted against the perceived indignity to which Germany had 
purportedly been subjected by writing: “In medieval theory, the just war meant 
that the victor had the right to enslave the subjects of his opponent and to seize his 
land; today, with more highly organized forms of mass domination it means above 
all: determining the constitution and regime of the defeated.”51 Perhaps it would 
offer some consolation to him to observe the very real difficulties the Coalition has 
had and continues to have to impose any type of functioning government, let alone 
one of its own volition, thereby attesting to the inherent limits of power projection. 
 
As the difficulties of the Coalition in Iraq attest to – particularly if contrasted to the 
relative success of the Afghanistan venture – societal transformation cannot be 
achieved without a modicum of domestic legitimacy which rests on and is reflected in 
international legitimacy. The best medium to obtain such legitimacy is through the 
established channels of the United Nations, which furthermore provide the legal 
instruments in the form of robust Security Council mandates to effect such wholesale 
transformational processes. In the absence of such international consensus and 
mandate, the strictures of the law of occupation serve precisely the same end as at the 
time of their conception, namely to prevent the abuse of power:  
 
                                                 
50 Phebe Marr, Occupational Hazards, FOREIGN AFFAIRS no pagination (2005). 
51 CARL SCHMITT, GLOSSARIUM: AUFZEICHNUNGEN DER JAHRE 1947-1951 (1991), 269.; Stirk 
correctly terms this a “dubious analogy that nevertheless says a great deal about his perception of the 
experience.” Peter Stirk, Carl Schmitt, the Law of Occupation, and the Iraq War, 11 CONSTELLATIONS 
(2004), 527. 
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[It is] a false premise that Article 43 of the Hague Convention conferred upon the 
occupying power a positive right to legislate; … it is inaccurate to say that by virtue of 
the Convention the occupant has been given any portion of legislative authority; … it 
appears from the text of the Convention itself and from the preliminary work that all 
that was intended … was to restrict the abuse of force by the occupant and not to give 
him or recognize him as possessing any authority in the sphere of law.52 
 
The shortcomings of the Coalition performance with regard to maintenance of 
public order and security are compounded by the perception of financial 
impropriety53 during the occupation period resulting not only in the loss of 
                                                 
52 The Belgian Court of Appeal held likewise in the case of Mathot v. Longué relating to the First World 
War, 19 February 1921, quoted in Conor McCarthy, The Paradox of the International Law of Military 
Occupation: Sovereignty and the Reformation of Iraq, 10 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 
(2005), 47, emphasis added. 
53 When the CPA assumed its work, there were about 6 billion US$ left over from the UN Oil for Food 
Programme plus sequestered and frozen accounts, as well as at least 10 billion US$ from resumed Iraqi 
oil exports. S/RES/1483 of 22 May 2003, para. 12 “takes note” of the establishment of the Development 
Fund for Iraq (DFI) and mandates in para. 16 (d) that earlier accounts established pursuant to Resolution 
986 (1995), paras. 8 (a) and 8 (b) are to be consolidated in it.  
While para. 13 “notes” the fact that this Fund will be disbursed under the direction of the CPA, 
Resolution 1483, para. 14 stresses that the Fund “shall be used in a transparent manner” for the benefit of 
the Iraqi people and “in consultation with the Iraqi interim administration” (para. 13). For this purpose 
the CPA set up the ‘Program Review Board’ to award respective contracts and to administer the DFI on 
behalf of the Iraqi people, as well as the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund provided by Congress (an 
additional 18.4 billion US$) on behalf of the American people. 
Resolution 1483, para. 12 required the establishment of an International Advisory and Monitoring Board 
(IAMB) to be composed of senior members of international developing finance institutions to oversee 
how the DFI was spent. In consultation with the CPA it appointed the Bahrain office of the international 
accounting firm KPMG to audit these expenses. The reports of both KPMG and the IAMB lamented the 
“resistance encountered from CPA staff” and stated “financial irregularities.” Furthermore, despite its 
repeated requests and assurances by the CPA to the IAMB that meters would be installed/repaired, this 
was never done during the tenure of the CPA, suggesting significant under-reporting of oil exports; the 
unaccounted revenue is estimated to be between 2-4 billion US$. 8.8 billion US$ passing through Iraq 
ministries during the CPA’s tenure remain unaccounted for. 3 billion US$ in new contracts were handed 
out in the last weeks of the CPA, to be managed by the US embassy. See International Advisory and 
Monitoring Board, Development Fund for Iraq Audit, 2004, IAMB, available at: 
www.iamb.info/dfiaudit.htm; International Advisory and Monitoring Board, Appendix to the audit of the 
Development Fund for Iraq - Matters noted involving internal controls and other operations issues during the 
audit of the Fund for the period up to 31 December 2003, 2004, IAMB; International Advisory and Monitoring 
Board, KPMG's Audit Notes, 2004, IAMB, available at: www.iamb.info/auditrep/r052203a.pdf. 
Further evidence has been provided by the CPA’s own Inspector General’s Office (CPAIG), now 
renamed Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (Sigir), particularly concerning the above 
mentioned new contracts. (“we identified deficiencies in the control of cash … of such magnitude as to 
require prompt attention. Those deficiencies were so significant the we were precluded from 
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substantial American and Iraqi resources, but also in loss of essential services not 
being provided. The troubling legal void surrounding Iraqi nationals in occupation 
captivity,54 and the perceived lack of accountability and legal redress for 
transgressions by occupation forces55 and their private contractors56 have further 
                                                                                                                             
accomplishing our stated objectives.”). Quoted in Ed Harriman, So, Mr Bremer, Where Did All the Money 
Go?, THE GUARDIAN/LONDON REVIEW OF BOOKS, 9 July 2006. 
Part of this wastage has been defended one the one hand by the need to kick-start the economy (“pour in 
billions of dollars. That is the only way to do it. It does not matter where it goes; we just need to get the 
economy moving. We could drop it from helicopters and it would probably do about as much good as 
most USAID programs”, Howard Wiarda in Lauth et al., Building the Institutions of the Nation, 33 
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (2004), 193.) The other 
justification has been to purchase security by paying off informants and warlords,  a strategy used to 
good effect already in Afghanistan, see inter alia Jonathan Goodhand, From War Economy to Peace 
Economy? Reconstruction and State Building in Afghanistan, 58 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 
155 (2004). 
These are Iraqi funds that are being wasted and embezzled, not American ones. It has been criticised 
that during its operation, the CPA spent up to 20 billion US$ of Iraqi money through the DFI, while only 
about 400 million (!) US$ out of 18.4 billion US$ provided by Congress. This has been partly explained 
by the desire to reduce the burden on the American treasury, partly by avoiding oversight by the 
Congressional Accounting Office. See --, --, Rules and Cash Flew Out of the Window, LA TIMES; Ariana 
Eunjung Cha, In Iraq, the Job Opportunity of a Lifetime: Managing a $13 Billion Budget With No Experience, 
WASHINGTON POST, at A01; Wikipedia, Coalition Provisional Authority, 2006, available at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coalition_Provisional_Authority. 
Whether these practices are in line with the usufructuary requirements of the law of occupation can be 
doubted. For a detailed discussion see Ed Harriman, So, Mr Bremer, Where Did All the Money Go?, THE 
GUARDIAN/LONDON REVIEW OF BOOKS.; see also Eyal Benvenisti, Water Conflicts During the 
Occupation of Iraq, 97 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003), 869; Antonio Cassese, 
Powers and Duties of an Occupant in Relation to Land and Natural Resources, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: TWO DECADES OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION 
OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP (Emma Playfair ed., 1992); U.S. Department of State, 
Memorandum of Law on Israel's Right to Develop New Oil Fields in Sinai and the Gulf of Suez, 16 ILM (1977), 
743.; (“property can be taken only for the purposes of the occupation itself”); especially pertinent: 
ERNST H. FEILCHENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW OF BELLIGERENT 
OCCUPATION (1942), 55.; (“While the belligerent occupant may lease or utilize public lands or 
buildings, sell the crops, cut and sell timber, and work the mines, a lease or contract should not extent 
beyond the conclusion of the war.” Emphasis added.) 
54 Human Rights Watch, Leadership Failure: Firsthand Accounts of Torture Or Iraqi Detainees By the U.S. 
Army's 82Nd Airborne Division, VOLUME 17, NO. 3(G) (2005); Amnesty International, Beyond Abu Ghraib: 
Dentention and Torture in Iraq, Mde 14/001/2006, (2006). 
55 For a fairly sympathetic discussion stressing the “dedication and professionalism of those involved at 
the CPA and other entities that worked so hard during the transition from dictatorial rule to a new 
government based on democratic principles” see  J. Stephen Shi, The Legal Status of Foreign Military and 
Civilian Personnel Following the Transfer of Power to the Iraqi Interim Government, 33 GEORGIA JOURNAL 
OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 245-60 (2004). 
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eroded popular trust in the occupation regime. Particularly the issue of immunity57 
extended summarily and prospectively58 to virtually any non-Iraqi entity or 
individual59 has proved to be controversial, both domestically and internationally.60 
While it might appear to an American observer that the measures chosen are 
“appropriate and reasonable,”61 to the average Iraqi, particularly within the Shi’i 
community, the similarity to the founding act of the Iranian revolution62 won’t be 
lost.  
 
 
C. The Purpose of the Law of Occupation  
 
In order to minimise the impact of violence in war in the widest possible arenas, 
international humanitarian law deliberately takes no position on the legitimacy of 
the conflict as such. The law of occupation stipulates a simple factual test,63 i.e. any 
territory “actually placed under the authority of the hostile army,” is deemed to be 
                                                                                                                             
56 On this aspect in general see Peter Warren Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized 
Military Firms and International Law, 42 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 521 et seq. 
(2004); Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and Military Force in Liberal 
States, 36 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW 879 et seq. (2004). 
57 CPA/ORD/17 June 2004/17 (Status of the Coalition Provisional Authority, MNF-Iraq, Certain Missions and 
Personnel in Iraq) (revising and extending the earlier Order No. 17) 
58 CPA/ORD/17 June 2004/17, though issued by the CPA in the last days of its operation was aimed at 
regulating the situation under the authority of the Iraqi Interim Government, i.e. after the handover of 
sovereignty. 
59 CPA/ORD/17 June 2004/17 §1; this includes all official military and diplomatic personnel and also 
anyone working under any type of “contract” as defined in §1(13). 
60 Amnesty International, Iraq: Memorandum on Concerns Relating to the Rule of Law, Mde 14/157/2003, 
(2003); Amnesty International, Iraq: Memorandum on Concerns Related to Legislation Introduced By the 
Coalition Provisional Authority, Mde/14/176/2003, (2003). 
61 Shi, The Legal Status of Foreign Military and Civilian Personnel, 33 GEORGIA JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (2004), 260. 
62 The conclusion of a treaty granting immunity to American military personnel in Iran in 1963 led to 
Ruhollah Khomeini breaking ranks with the quietist ulema to openly challenge the government. This led 
to his incarceration, in the course of which he was promoted to the rank of Ayatollah, presumably to save 
him from execution, and his subsequent banishment to Iraq, where he remained until 1977 and from 
where he organised the successful revolution. See ERVAND ABRAHAMIAN, KHOMEINISM: ESSAYS 
ON THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC (1993); BAQER MOIN, KHOMEINI: THE LIFE OF THE AYATOLLAH 
(2000); CHIBLI MALLAT, THE RENEWAL OF ISLAMIC LAW : MUHAMMAD BAQER AS-SADR, 
NAJAF, AND THE SHI’I INTERNATIONAL (1993). 
63 McCarthy, The Paradox of the International Law of Military Occupation, 10 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT 
AND SECURITY LAW (2005), 45. 
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occupied for the purpose of the applicability of the rules.64 This factual test does 
neither depend on the recognition of the occupation by the occupier nor is it 
contingent on the armed conflict that gave rise to the occupation having been in 
conformity with international law.65 
 
The law of occupation provides the legal framework for the temporary exercise of 
governmental authority by the occupier, trying to strike a balance between his 
security needs and the interests of the population.66 There has been much 
commentary about the increasing inadequacy of the basic premise underlying the 
law of occupation, namely that the exercise of temporary authority to which the 
occupier is entitled does not grant him a mandate to introduce wholesale changes 
in the legal, political, and economic structure of the territory in question.67 
 
Calls for a revision of the rules and references to the alleged inadequacy of the law 
of occupation seem to start from the assumption of a certain commonality of 
interests, sometimes likened to some form of trusteeship.68 But it is by no means 
self-evident that such a commonality of interests actually exists. In most instances 
                                                 
64 Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 2 AJIL Supp. 90 (1908), Article 42, the 
emphasis on factual control rather than legal definition is further evidenced in the remainder of Article 
42: “The occupation extends only to territory where such authority has been established and can be 
exercised.” 
65 Wolfrum, Iraq: From Belligerent Occupation to Iraqi Exercise of Sovereignty, 9 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK 
OF UNITED NATIONS LAW (2005), 4-5, especially fn. 8., notes the wider scope of Article 2 (2) of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention which also applies to an occupation meeting no armed resistance; 
Christopher Greenwood, The Administration of Occupied Territories in International Law, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: TWO 
DECADES OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP (Emma Playfair ed., 
1992), 243. 
66 Wolfrum, Iraq: From Belligerent Occupation to Iraqi Exercise of Sovereignty, 9 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK 
OF UNITED NATIONS LAW (2005), 8. 
67 Article 43 of the Hague Regulations leaves little to the imagination in this respect; “The authority of 
the legitimate power having in fact passed to the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all measures 
in his power to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless 
absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.” Emphasis added 
68 A. Gerson, Trustee-Occupant: The Legal Status of Israel's Presence in the West Bank, 14 HARVARD 
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 1-49 (1978); A. GERSON, ISRAEL, THE WEST BANK AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1978), 78-82. For a critical discussion of this approach see A. Roberts, What is a 
Military Occupation?, 55 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1984), 292; H.H. Perritt, Jr., 
Structures and Standards for Political Trusteeship, 8 UCLA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 385 et seq. (2003); Rüdiger Wolfrum, International Administration in Post-Conflict 
Situations By the United Nations and Other International Actors, 9 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED 
NATIONS LAW (2005), 672-73. 
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the belligerent occupant will not possess the legitimacy of brokering a political 
process in which it can evidently not remain neutral.69 The reference to the obvious 
necessity of political change on which the claims for the revision of the law of 
occupation are based also confounds the legal nature of occupation. This position 
seems to infer from the evident necessity to effect socio-political changes that the 
international law instrument of occupation can no longer be considered comprehen-
sive since it explicitly prohibits such change. But this position confounds an alleged 
constitutive with the actual prohibitive nature of international humanitarian law 
according to which occupation: 
 
is a fact recognised and regulated by international law and not an 
institution created by it. The military occupant derives its power not 
from international law as such but from the successful projection of 
military superiority.70 
 
The demand is therefore based on the erroneous supposition of the constitutive 
nature of the law of occupation, while its sole purpose is to proscribe certain types of 
conduct by the occupant. It must thus be seen as a negative boundary marker very 
much along the lines of “negative liberties” defined by Berlin with regard to human 
rights,71 i.e. spheres of autonomy protected by legal stipulations against the 
encroachment of the state.72 The purpose of the law is therefore to prevent potential 
abuse by deliberately limiting the freedom of action of the occupant, not to enable 
action in the pursuit of lofty ideals: 
 
the occupying power acquires no positive rights stricto sensu within 
the occupied territory at all, whether to instigate legislative change 
or craft structural reforms within the occupied territory. The occu-
pying power only acquires responsibilities that are derived from the 
international legal regulation of this factual situation concerning 
how the fact of its power can be exercised. … So in respect of Iraq, 
                                                 
69 H.H. Perritt, Jr., Iraq and the Future of the United States Foreign Policy: Failures of Legitimacy, 31 
SYRACUSE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMMERCE 149 et seq. (2004). 
70  McCarthy, The Paradox of the International Law of Military Occupation, 10 JOURNAL OF 
CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW (2005), 46, emphasis added; Christopher Greenwood, The 
Administration of Occupied Territories in International Law, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: TWO DECADES OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF 
THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP (Emma Playfair ed., 1992), 251. 
71  Isaja Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (Isaja Berlin ed., 1969), 129. 
72  Negative rights are categorical and absolute rights which “must be respected here and now,” D. 
RAPHAEL, POLITICAL THEORY AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN (1967), 51, 53. 
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the question in relation to the competence of the occupying powers 
is, in strict terms, not to what extent do they have a right to institute 
legislative and institutional reformation, but rather to what extent 
is their factual capacity to institute reformation constrained by obliga-
tions in international law.73  
 
This primary role as a negative boundary marker is further underlined by the obvious 
scepticism that the humiliated population will feel towards the occupant. Legally, the 
situation couldn’t be clearer: “the occupying power [is] to be considered as merely 
being a de facto administrator. This provision of the Hague Regulations (Art. 43) is not 
only applicable to the inhabitants of the occupied territory; it also protects the separate 
existence of the state, its institutions and its laws.”74 Policy-wise, the tremendous 
difficulties encountered in the attempted transformation of Iraq might induce some 
caution about disregarding the rules in the future. 
 
 
D. Alleged Inadequacy of the Law of Occupation 
 
To avoid reputational costs associated with the rejection of the normative 
framework of international humanitarian law, the Coalition has maintained that the 
requirement of abiding by international humanitarian law in respective Security 
Council Resolutions 1483 and 1511 notwithstanding75 must be read in conjunction 
with an alleged mandate for transformation contained therein. On the other hand it 
has stressed its essentially benevolent motivations which should exempt its actions 
from being measured against normative constraints developed for less benevolent 
actors.  
 
The Coalition has thus in effect claimed the legitimacy deriving from international law 
without accepting the limitations this normative commitment would entail. A two-
fold rhetorical strategy is deployed: the existence of a mandate implicit in the 
Security Council resolutions, or, alternatively, the obsolescence of the comprehen-
sive norm, thus necessitating its unilateral modification. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
73 McCarthy, The Paradox of the International Law of Military Occupation, 10 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT 
AND SECURITY LAW (2005), 46-7, emphasis in the original. 
74 JEAN PICTET (ED.), COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION IV OF 1949 (1958), 273. 
75 S/RES/1483 (2003) of 22 May 2003, preamb. para. 13, op. para. 5. 
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I. Limited Mandate 
 
Due to the purely factual basis of occupation, its legal qualification does not depend 
on either proclamation by the occupant nor recognition by others.76 Nevertheless, the 
Coalition sought and obtained a recognition by the Security Council. One hoped that 
this move would increase the legitimacy of the occupation authorities by giving it the 
possibility to claim a certain international mandate, however limited it might in fact 
have been. The avowed aim of seeking this alleged mandate “was to evade legal 
difficulties if the occupying powers sought to move beyond the limited rights 
conferred by the Hague Regulations and Geneva Convention IV to vary existing 
arrangements.”77 The occupation powers have consistently claimed that they 
possess adequate authority to administer Iraq by arguing that it is “to be exercised 
under relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1483 (2003), 
and the laws and usages of war.”78 They have thus expressly claimed that 
Resolution 1483 and 1511 in combination with the laws of war give them a mandate 
for their policies.  
 
It is clear from the text of the resolutions, as well as from the negotiation history of 
Resolutions 1483 and 1511 that any move that could be perceived as legitimising the 
invasion post-fact was to be avoided. Again, the language used in the resolutions is 
more accurately described as placing limits on the occupation forces than giving it 
licence for transformation. In particular the rules concerning international financial 
oversight of the Development Fund for Iraq79 were disregarded by the Coalition80 
underscoring the fundamental incongruity of interests between the occupant and the 
occupied population. The actual experience with the occupation of Iraq seems thus to 
advocate, if anything, for placing even stricter limits on the occupant, not loosening 
available restrictions. 
 
Scheffer argues for the necessity of a more “pragmatic body of rules and procedures 
than occupation law currently affords,” including in situations were multilateral forces 
are deployed in prolonged occupations aimed at profound societal transformation that 
                                                 
76 McCarthy, The Paradox of the International Law of Military Occupation, 10 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT 
AND SECURITY LAW (2005), 45; Benvenisti, Water Conflicts During the Occupation of Iraq, 97 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003), 861-63. 
77 House of Commons, Iraq: Law of Occupation, House of Commons Library Research Paper 03/51, (2003), 25. 
78 CPA/REG/16 May 2003/01. 
79 S/RES/1483 (2003) of 22 May 2003, op. paras. 12-14. 
80 See the discussion in fn. 53 above. 
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do enjoy widespread international support. He posits that such a body of modern 
occupation law should “accommodate the twin realities of the impact of UN 
authorization and delegation of responsibilities to military forces deployed into a 
territory and the international community’s intent to transform a society under 
military occupation.”81 While it is certainly correct that occupation law was never 
meant to encompass the kind of transformational processes that are the explicit aim of 
UN peacekeeping operations and UN-mandated enforcement action,82 and while a 
revised body of occupation law is certainly conceivable that takes account of the 
special requirements of such operations,83 the far-reaching transformation necessary in 
Iraq is largely unsuited to occupation law and could have been dealt with satisfactorily 
only by a Security Council mandate “setting forth clear responsibilities for deployed 
forces and a UN-supervised civilian administrative structure” until a legitimate 
domestic government could have taken over.84 
 
Thus as Scheffer himself points out, in cases where there is international consensus, a 
sui generis Security Council mandate can provide the occupant with the legal 
instruments to effect the desired changes on behalf of the international community.85 But 
in the absence of such international consensus it is appropriate that occupation law 
imposes stricter limits86 and entails greater potential legal exposure, both in terms of 
individual culpability and state responsibility.87 In the case of an openly hostile, clearly 
not disinterested occupation, which furthermore does not enjoy clear international 
support, however, these strictures of occupation law, including the prohibition to 
change the institutional, legal, and administrative make-up of the state in question 
                                                 
81 Scheffer, Beyond Occupation Law, 97 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003), 843-
44. 
82 EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION (2004), 166-67; Brian D. 
Tittemore, Belligerents in Blue Helmets: Applying International Humanitarian Law to United Nations Peace 
Operations, 33 STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 61 et seq. (1997). 
83 Roberts, What is a Military Occupation?, 55 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1984), 
302-05. 
84 Scheffer, Beyond Occupation Law, 97 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003), 853. 
85 This approach of “outsourcing” the provision of internally-mandated peacekeeping to groups of 
nation states under unified national command rather than multilateral UN control has been explicitly 
welcomed in academic and official literature. See Brahimi / et al., Report of the Panel on United Nations 
Peace Operations, (2000). 
86 Scheffer, Beyond Occupation Law, 97 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003), 843-
44.  
87 Scheffer is, however, quick to assert that “this rather anaemic body of international law remains 
difficult to enforce against either governments or individuals,” Scheffer, Beyond Occupation Law, 97 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003), 857. 
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might therefore very well be surprisingly pertinent to the requirements of the modern 
age.  
 
 
II. Obsolescence 
 
The above claim that a mandate could be implied from said resolutions must be 
contrasted with the position that neither said resolutions nor the laws of war 
conferred any legal title or authority but merely recognised a factual situation 
resulting from military reality. The reference to the law of occupation serves merely 
to remind the occupant of its responsibilities vis-à-vis the occupied population and, 
in particular, the limitations on its freedom of action concerning the introduction of 
institutional and legal changes to the existing state structure. Faced with the charge 
that it acted ultra vires the occupation powers have adopted an alternative position 
and rejected the strictures of the law of war as obsolete and open to re-
interpretation. The following remarks, while not officially sanctioned, seem 
indicative of this approach: 
 
one of the things that’s distinctive about international actors mak-
ing changes to international law is that you can just do it. The 
United States has simply declared that these changes in Iraqi law 
are legitimate pursuant to international law. There is no one in Iraq 
to tell us otherwise. … Basically the international law of occupation 
is in the process of transformation, and the standard treatises and 
books on the subject are, I think it is fair to say, obsolete as of now 
with respect to these questions.88 
 
                                                 
88 Noah Feldman, Edited Transcript: What We Owe Iraq, 2005, Carnegie Council on Ethics and 
International Affairs, available at: www.carnegiecouncil.org, emphasis added. 
This somewhat nonchalant position is also shared by other legal writers. For instance with respect to the 
debatable foundation for the establishment of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, one American international 
lawyer posits two distinct pillars to establish the Tribunal's legitimacy. She alleges that international 
humanitarian law has evolved since Hague and Geneva and now “recognize[s] the need for an 
occupying power to be permitted to change the laws of an occupied state in order to render 
humanitarian aid. This broader interpretation of occupation law under the Geneva Conventions, 
allowing both occupation and the alteration of an occupied state's laws for humanitarian purposes, 
would legitimize the IST [Iraqi Special Tribunal] as a judicial institution, despite its formation by an 
occupying power with or without military necessity.” Linda Malone / Christopher M. Rassi / Laura 
Dickinson, Issue #3: Is the Iraqi Special Tribunal, which was established on December 10, 2003 by the Occupying 
Power and the unelected Iraqi Governing Council, a legitimate judicial institution?, 2005, available at: 
http://law.case.edu/saddamtrial. 
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The prohibition to introduce political changes into an occupied territory has been 
criticised as no longer adequate for the kind of military engagements likely to lead 
to occupation, as they increasingly concern failed or aggressive states where a 
transformation of its system of governance is the very reason for the military 
intervention in the first place.89 Some have suggested a distinction between a 
belligerent and a post-surrender occupation, while in the former the prohibition of 
introducing political changes applies, structural change in the latter would be 
possible.90 It is, however, not at all clear how this position differs from the obsolete 
doctrine of debellatio,91 nor is there any textual basis for such a distinction in either 
Hague or Geneva law. It is furthermore difficult to square this position with the 
language of Resolutions 1483 and 1511.92 
 
Others who supported the introduction of far-reaching societal and institutional 
changes have argued that the law of occupation enables the occupant “to wield the 
totality of sovereign powers that had formerly been vested in the defeated govern-
ment.” This position can hardly be deduced from current international law, as is 
clearly stated in the US Army Field Manual which these authors proceed to quote, 
apparently oblivious to contradiction between their position and current 
international law according to which, as the Manual correctly states, occupation 
“does not transfer the sovereignty to the occupant, but simply the authority or 
power to exercise some of the rights of sovereignty.”93 
 
                                                 
89 Wolfrum, Iraq: From Belligerent Occupation to Iraqi Exercise of Sovereignty, 9 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK 
OF UNITED NATIONS LAW (2005), 8. 
90 As for instance in Germany or Japan. A. Gerson, War, Conquered Territory and Military Occupation in the 
Contemporary International Legal System, 18 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL (1977). 
91 BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION (2004), 92-96; McCarthy, The Paradox 
of the International Law of Military Occupation, 10 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 
(2005), 49; Scheffer, Beyond Occupation Law, 97 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2003), 848. 
92 “Reaffirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq, …expressing resolve that the day when 
Iraqis govern themselves must come quickly,” S/RES/1483 (2003) of 22 May 2003, preamb. paras. 2 and 
4.  
“Underscoring that the sovereignty of Iraq resides in the State of Iraq, reaffirming the right of the Iraqi 
people freely to determine their own political future and control their own natural resources,, reiterating 
its resolve that the day when Iraqis govern themselves must come quickly”, S/RES/1511 (2003) of 16 
October 2003, preamb. para. 2. 
93 David B. Jr. Rivkin / Darin B. Bartram, Military Occupation: Legally Ensuring a Lasting Peace, 26 THE 
WASHINGTON QUARTERLY (2003), 95, 97, emphasis added; Stirk, Carl Schmitt, the Law of Occupation, 
and the Iraq War, 11 CONSTELLATIONS (2004), 533. 
2006]                                                                                                                                   585 The Continued Relevance of Occupation Law
Logically more consistent, but legally equally questionable is the position expressed 
by Feldman: 
 
The position of the U.S. government was and is that these laws [en-
acted by the CPA to effect societal and institutional change] were 
permissible under international law because they were necessary to 
accomplish public life and order,94 and that they would remain on the 
books until such time as a legitimate Iraqi government wished to 
change them.95 
 
It is argued, however, that these law enjoyed less than perfect legitimacy, and 
thereby compromised the overall political reconstruction effort which was based on 
them. The relative failure of that process attests, if anything, to the continued 
relevancy of the prohibitions of the law of occupation. The alleged agency for either 
the Iraqi people or the international community in the pursuit of “freedom” 
manifestly did not exist in the face of sustained domestic resistance and strong 
international criticism. As to the claim that an implied mandate must be deemed to 
have existed because of the evident necessity to alter the unsustainable status quo 
in Iraq, one cannot but agree with Scheffer who maintains that transformational 
process in Iraq “requires strained interpretations of occupation law to suit modern 
requirements. Such unique circumstances are far better addressed by a tailored 
nation-building mandate of the Security Council.”96  
 
 
III. Motivations Matter 
 
American policy over Iraq can be seen as the result of a long-term change in legal 
and political perception in which the sacrosanct nature of state sovereignty lost 
credence in line with the reduction of the systemic need for stability after the end of 
the Cold War and the perceived analytical and normative shortcomings of the 
concept.97 This essentially liberal intellectual movement,98 however, was made 
                                                 
94 On the validity of that argument see the discussion in Wolfrum, Iraq: From Belligerent Occupation to 
Iraqi Exercise of Sovereignty, 9 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW (2005), 5; 
Ebrahim Afsah, Iraq: From “Troubled Law of Occupation” to Constitutional Order? China Shop Rules and 
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95 Noah Feldman, Edited Transcript: What We Owe Iraq, 2005, Carnegie Council on Ethics and 
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96 Scheffer, Beyond Occupation Law, 97 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003), 843. 
97 Ryan Goodman / Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55 STANFORD 
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possible by the relative demise of realism as the voice of conservative caution and 
moderation in foreign policy. The reason realism had become the dominant school 
of thought throughout the Cold War was the premium it placed on stability and 
maintaining the status quo through the balance of power. It was thus particularly 
sceptical of moralising crusades, not only because they could have derailed the 
fragile nuclear peace, but because the theory was based on the realisation that 
despite their internal differences states as international actors are constrained to 
behave essentially the same.99 With the end of the constraints of the Cold War, 
other theoretical schools came to dominate, arguing that American primacy now 
warranted a more activist foreign policy in the pursuit of values, not merely the 
maintenance of the status quo. Realist voices for caution100 became lost influence, 
and increasingly states were no longer seen as interchangeable systemic actors101 
but placed along a normatively ranked spectrum on whose polar ends the United 
States and “rogue states”102 were respectively placed. 
 
Claims for an activist foreign policy in the pursuit of liberal values were echoed by 
neo-conservative calls for the active transformation of the international system to 
enhance American security by transforming hostile powers into friendly ones.103 
We can thus observe a convergence between two very different intellectual strands 
that combined to form the policy over Iraq.104 Unlike realism, both of these schools 
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of thought consider the internal composition of states to be important determinants 
of foreign policy, and thus having immediate security implications:105 
 
we’ll wage a comprehensive strategy to defend our country, and 
we will use every asset at our disposal. And one of the most pow-
erful assets we have is freedom. Free nations do not breed resent-
ment. Free nations do not export terror. Free nations become allies 
in the war against terror. By spreading freedom, we help [to] keep 
the peace.106 
 
In this new way of looking at the world107 motivations matter. Those of the “other” 
matter because such states “breed resentment and export terror,” but “our” 
motivations matter, too, because they serve to “spread freedom and keep the 
peace” and are thus by definition benevolent and benign. With regard to the law of 
occupation, this differentiation is taken up and the restrictions placed upon the 
occupant are rejected because they fail to take into account the benevolent 
intentions of the Coalition. The restrictive nature of the rules of belligerent 
occupation were designed to prevent the exploitation of a given territory and its 
inhabitants by a hostile occupant, they are inapplicable in a situation where the 
external power is in effect the agent of the liberation of the population. It is thereby 
not only acting on behalf of the liberated populace but the international community 
as well. While thus technically a belligerent occupant, it is claimed that its benign 
motivations make it effectively a trustee exercising operational control on behalf of 
that population, if not the international community.108  
 
 
E. Limiting Power and the Limits of Power 
 
The above position runs counter to the neutral underpinning of the doctrine which 
treats occupation as simply a factual matter of actual control, totally divorced from 
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the separate issue of ius ad bellum:109 “the question of the legality of the war is 
separate from the question of the occupation as such.”110 Occupation law is agnostic 
as to the motivations or the alleged legitimacy of the political programme pursued 
by the occupant, but it starts from the assumption that in the context of an armed 
conflagration that gives rise to the occupation in the first place it is unlikely to be 
perceived by the target population as acting in its best interest. Whatever the alleged 
shortcomings of the law of occupation, we argue that any “process of transforma-
tion” cannot simply be put into motion by unilateral fiat: “International law, in 
principle, does not legitimize the introduction of political changes. … Stating that 
such a change may contribute to the restoration of peace does not yet answer 
whether unilateral actions allegedly pursuing such a purpose conform to existing 
international law.”111  
 
There is an inherent tension between the interests of the occupant of maintaining 
security and control over the occupied territory, and the desire to restore popular 
sovereignty, if possible in a democratic setting.112 Occupying powers have often 
found it convenient to reject popular claims for participation with reference to these 
obligations.113 This fundamental conflict of interest is exacerbated in  the context of 
massive nationalistic and religious mobilisation and against the background of a 
previous war and twelve years of a humiliating and devastating sanction regime 
imposed by that very occupant.  
 
It has been pointed out that the essence of an occupation regime lies in its self-
referrential and unlimited nature: “Occupation represents not a constitutional 
government characterised by a balance of powers but rather a sort of emergency 
government in which all forms of power are concentrated in one centralised body.” 
114 The CPA has explicitly acknowledged this situation in its Regulation No. 1: “The 
CPA is invested with all executive, legislative and judicial authority necessary to 
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achieve its objectives, to be exercised under relevant U.N. Security Council 
resolutions, including Resolution 1483 (2003), and the laws and usages of war. This 
authority shall be exercised by the CPA Administrator.”115 The Regulation 
continues to define its operation, specifying that regulations “shall be those 
instruments that define the institutions and authorities of the CPA” while orders are 
its “binding instructions.”  
 
The legitimate authority to do all this is simply deemed to exist by reference to the 
supposedly constituting nature of international law and Security Council resolutions. 
As we have seen this claim is questionable. An occupation regime ultimately rests on 
the projection of military power, and is not dependent on the constitutive character of 
its recognition in international law. The mounting insurgency has exposed fairly 
drastically the physical limits of the imposition of institutional change by force, and 
is a powerful reminder of the necessity to be perceived as acting legitimately, not 
least through abiding by the limitations imposed by the law of occupation. 
 
 
F. Conclusion 
 
The question posed by Fraenkel whether occupation law can in principle be 
limited116 has been answered by the protective measures introduced by the Forth 
Geneva Convention,117 and it appears that recent experience in Iraq and elsewhere 
highlights the continued relevance of an objective standard against which to 
measure abuse. Calls for the alleged inadequacy of occupational law and the 
unilateral disregard of its rules under the guise of “developing” the law are not 
only flawed logically and legally, but also make for bad policy.  
 
As a high ranking UN lawyer observes in this regard, one might get away with 
heavy-handed action because one’s physical superiority permits it, but one risks in 
the process to “win the battle but loose the war.”118 This seems in large measure to 
be an accurate description of the occupation of Iraq. Simon Chesterman writes: 
“Modern trusteeships demand, above all, trust on the part of local actors. Earning 
and keeping that trust requires a level of understanding, sensitivity, and respect for 
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local traditions and political aspirations that has often been lacking in international 
administration.”119 Few would argue that the occupation possessed these qualities, 
a fact not entirely lost on the Iraqi public. 
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